Kirill Nazarenko.

The Navy and Government in Russia: from Tsushima battle down to the Civil war (1905-1921)

The armed forces are one of the most important attributes of a country’s independence. Under normal circumstances they seem to be an obedient instrument in the hands of the government. However, the navy (as well as the army) is to a large extent an autonomous body independent of the civil state apparatus and capable not only of active resilience to any intervention on the side of the government within the sphere of its competence but also of active interference into the country’s domestic and foreign policy. In its most extreme manifestation this interference could result in a coup d’etat but there are many more subtle ways of influencing such as the impact of the armed forces’ public opinion (above all – officers’), or personal influence of some representatives of the army and the navy on certain political leaders, possession of exclusive knowledge and information, an opportunity of interpreting the term ‘usefulness’ when targeting finances of the defense budget. The representatives of the armed forces could affect the country’s public opinion by creating an image of an ‘enemy’ or a ‘friend’ and convincing the people in the practical value of these or that decisions concerning military construction & etc.

This research is devoted to the history of the development of governing bodies of the Russian navy within the period starting at the end of Russo-Japanese war and up to the end of the Civil War. It was during this period that the command of the navy was actively trying to influence the country’s leadership with the purpose of reviving the navy after the Tsushima battle and then bringing it out to world’s leadership (on the verge of World War I) and, finally, saving the navy from abolishment during the Civil war. It was within the years 1905-1921 that the so-called “Young Turks’ (‘mladoturki’) of the General Staff of the Navy’ – a group of talented young officers attempting with extraordinary tenacity to introduce their vision of administering the navy – were particularly active. This milieu produced many outstanding military and political leaders including admiral Kolchak.

After the Russo-Japanese war the reform of administration of the Russian navy went along a serious fight concerning the copying of the German system of organisation of commandment of the Central Naval Forces which never happened in the end. After the appointment of I. K. Grigorovich as the Minister of the Navy (he held this position between 1911-1917) the adversaries in the navy ceased and all the energies were directed on the construction of new ships. Not least, by the beginning of World War I the Naval Intelligence and Counterintelligence had been organized and began to function efficiently. In the course of World War I the system of coordination between the army and the navy was changed several times which, however, only had an insignificant influence over the course of military actions.

The February revolution of 1917 saw the navy men becoming an active revolutionary force. Within a year (until March 1917) they, headed by P.I. Dybenko, played a great political role. October 1917 witnessed a situation that had never happened in history – an ordinary sailor Dybenko practically headed the Naval department. Nevertheless, the revolutionary sailors preserved a high degree of esteem for specialist navy officers and were happy to use their services should the officers themselves be ready to cooperate.

The need to create efficient Armed Forces of the Soviet Russia led to a clash between the Soviet government and the sailor’s elected bodies (January-March 1918). The necessity of reinstalling discipline and subordination was at odds with the spontaneous democratic spirit of the sailors’ committees which were gradually brought to nought.

The Red navy’s construction was formally headed by Leo Trotsky as a National Comissar of the Army and the Navy, but the Navy itself inherited the system of administration from the monarchic period. The reforms of its administration in 1918-1921 were to a great extent a realization of projects brought about already before World War I and the reorganization was carried out by the officers of the old Navy.

At the end of the Civil war, particularly after the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921, the tendency of the country’s political leadership to minimize the financing of the Navy and even, perhaps, to merge it with the Army showed itself very strongly. These plans caused a point-blank rejection and resilience not only on the part of the ‘old’ officers but also the former sailors who became navy commissars. As a result, an autonomous administering of the Navy within the Defense department was preserved until 1924. By that time an objective role of the Navy within the country’s defense system was only supplementary which predetermined the organizational merging of the military and the navy commissariats.